Generalizability vs. Robustness: Adversarial Examples for Medical
  Imaging by Paschali, Magdalini et al.
Generalizability vs. Robustness:
Adversarial Examples for Medical Imaging
Magdalini Paschali1, Sailesh Conjeti2, Fernando Navarro1, and Nassir Navab1,3
1 Computer Aided Medical Procedures, Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen, Germany
2 German Center for Neurodegenerative Diseases (DZNE), Bonn, Germany
3 Computer Aided Medical Procedures, Johns Hopkins University, USA
Abstract. In this paper, for the first time, we propose an evaluation
method for deep learning models that assesses the performance of a
model not only in an unseen test scenario, but also in extreme cases of
noise, outliers and ambiguous input data. To this end, we utilize adver-
sarial examples, images that fool machine learning models, while looking
imperceptibly different from original data, as a measure to evaluate the
robustness of a variety of medical imaging models. Through extensive
experiments on skin lesion classification and whole brain segmentation
with state-of-the-art networks such as Inception and UNet, we show that
models that achieve comparable performance regarding generalizability
may have significant variations in their perception of the underlying data
manifold, leading to an extensive performance gap in their robustness.
1 Introduction
Deep learning is being increasingly adopted within the medical imaging com-
munity for a plethora of tasks including classification, segmentation, detection
etc. The classic approach towards the assessment of any machine learning model
revolves around the evaluation of its generalizability i.e. its performance on un-
seen test scenarios. However, in case of limited training data, such as medical
imaging datasets, using heavily over-parameterized deep learning models could
lead to the ”memorization” of the training data. Evaluating such models on
an available non-overlapping test set is popular, yet significantly limited in its
ability to explore the model’s resilience to outliers and noisy data / labels (i.e.
robustness). Additionally, the limited interpretability of deep learning models
due to their ”black-box” nature challenges their adoption into clinical practice.
Existing model evaluation routines look deeply into over-fitting but insuffi-
ciently into scenarios of model sensitivity to variations of the input. Robustness
evaluation estimates potential failure probabilities when the model is pushed to
its limits. In this paper, we approach evaluating a model by leveraging adver-
sarial examples [1] that are crafted with the purpose of fooling a model and can
uncover cases where its performance may degenerate. Our approach to using ad-
versarial examples as benchmark is also significantly less laborious and expensive
than constituting a sufficiently diverse test set with manual annotation.
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Fig. 1: Overview of Adversarial Crafting and its effect on network prediction. The
difference between the generated adversarial image and the original image is impercep-
tible, yet deep neural networks are successfully fooled into anomalous predictions.
Adversarial examples are images crafted to purposely fool machine learning
models, while the added perturbations are imperceptible to human eyes [1],
as shown in Fig. 1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to
explore adversarial examples in medical image computing and leverage them
in a constructive fashion to benchmark model performance not only on clean
and noisy but also on adversarially crafted data. It must be noted that though
these examples may not occur in naturally acquired data, utilizing them can
present new opportunities for medical imaging researchers to uncover more about
their models, with the ultimate goal of increasing robustness and optimizing the
decision boundaries learned for different tasks.
Our contribution is two-fold: Firstly, we demonstrate on a variety of med-
ical image computing tasks that widely adopted state-of-the art deep learning
models are not immune to adversarial examples crafting. Secondly, we utilize
adversarial examples to benchmark model robustness by comparing a variety
of architectures, such as Inception [2] and UNet [3], for the tasks of skin lesion
classification and whole brain segmentation.
2 Methodology
2.1 Adversarial Crafting
Given a trained model F , an original input image X with output label Y , we
generate an adversarial example Xˆ by solving a box-constrained optimization
problem minXˆ‖Xˆ − X‖ subject to F (X) = Y , F (Xˆ) = Yˆ , Yˆ 6= Y and Xˆ ∈
[0, 1]. Such an optimization minimizes the added perturbation, say r (i.e. Xˆ =
X + r) while simultaneously fooling the model F [1]. By imposing an additional
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Fig. 2: Illustration of adversarial examples and their effect on model predictions.
Left: Skin lesion classification and Right: Whole brain segmentation. Note that
the added perturbation is effectively imperceptible to the human eye. Contrast-
ing with prediction on original images, the crafted examples are able to success-
fully fool the models into either misclassification or generating incorrect segmen-
tation maps.
constraint such as ‖r‖ ≤ , we can restrict the perturbation to be small enough
to be imperceptible to humans.
Classification: Gradient-based adversarial example generation methods have
been proposed with the objective of generating minimum amount of pertur-
bation r that mis-classifies Xˆ. These include the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [4], DeepFool (DF) [5], Saliency Map Attacks (SMA) [6] etc. Adversar-
ial examples crafted with these methods are shown in Fig. 2. For a trained model
F , FGSM performs a one-step pixel-level update along the sign of the gradient
that maximizes the task loss J and the resultant perturbation is computed as
r = sign (∇XJ(θ,X, Y )), where θ are the parameters of the model. The amount
of perturbation is regulated by a hyper-parameter  that is typically assigned a
low value, so that Xˆ is visually imperceptible from X.
Differing from FGSM, DF follows an iterative greedy search process, where
in each iteration the projections of the input sample to the decision boundaries
of all the classes are computed and an r is calculated that will push X towards
the closest decision boundary of a class, other than the correct one. In SMA, the
impact of each pixel on the prediction of the model is estimated and the input
is selectively perturbed to effect the most significant change to the output.
Segmentation: In [7], the authors introduced Dense Adversarial Generation
(DAG) as a method for crafting adversarial examples for semantic segmenta-
tion in a fast and effective way, closely resembling per-pixel, targeted FGSM.
Particularly, DAG utilizes an incorrect segmentation mask, given by the user,
and a target set of non-background pixels. Its goal is to calculate a minimum
perturbation r that will alter the prediction on the pixels in the target set from
the correct class to the incorrect target class.
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Fig. 3: t-SNE representation of
the embeddings of 3 classes
(red, blue and green) from
clean (•), noisy (◦) and adver-
sarial images (+). The noisy
examples (◦) are embedded
closer to clean data (L), while
adversarial ones are pushed to
the model boundaries (R).
Specifically, DAG minimizes the distance between the prediction for n pixels
of the ground truth Y = {y0, . . . , yn} and the incorrect target Y ′ = {y′0, . . . , y′n}
as shown in:
L(X,T, Y, Y ′) =
N∑
n=1
[zyn(X, tn)− zy′n(X, tn)],
where Z = {z0, . . . , zC−1} are the logits of the model and C the number of
classes. T represents a target set of non-background pixels that DAG is allowed
to perturb in order to constrain the search-space of the perturbation. In step m
the image has been transformed to Xm = X+
∑M
m=0 rm, where the perturbation
rm is computed by:
rm =
∑
tn∈T
[∇Xmzy′n(Xm, tn)−∇Xmzyn(Xm, tn)].
We utilized DAG to craft adversarial examples, seen in Fig. 2, by creating
targets with varying degrees of difficulty. Particularly, we set the target to be
all background (Type A), randomly assign a small percentage of pixels to a
randomly-selected adversarial class (Type B) and modify (dilate) only a partic-
ular target class while keeping all other classes intact (Type C). Of the afore-
mentioned attack types, Type A is the most challenging, causing the largest
amount of perturbation, while Type C is expected to distort the image the least,
as can be seen in Fig. 2. The Mean Square Error (MSE) between the original and
adversarial images remained extremely small, ranging from 0.004 for adversaries
of Type A to 0.002 for B and C.
2.2 Model Evaluation With Adversarial Examples
Our approach involves benchmarking models against a number of task-specific
adversarial attacks discussed in Sec. 2.1 that are crafted implicitly from the
data. The proposed pipeline for the evaluation of robustness is similar across
both classification and segmentation. For classification, we crafted adversarial
examples with FGSM, DF and SMA, while for segmentation we applied DAG
with 3 different types of targets (Type A-C). Afterwards we attacked our models
in a black-box fashion with examples generated by independently trained models,
to maintain an unbiased attack scenario. In addition to that, black-box attacks
highlight the transferability of these examples between a variety of different
models [8].
Contrasting with Noise: One could argue that applying noise on the test
images before inference could replace the need for adversarial examples. However,
that is not the case since hard ambiguous cases and outliers cannot be modeled
by noise distributions. Adversarial examples, which are crafted with the purpose
to force models to fail, are better suited for evaluating model behavior when
subject to input extrema. To showcase that adversarial perturbations do not
resemble noise distributions, we also crafted images distorted with modality-
specific noise (Gaussian noise for dermatoscopic images and Rician noise for
T1w MRI). For fairness, the Structural Similarity (SSIM) between the original
and noisy images was the same as the one between the original and adversarial
examples and ranged from 0.97 to 0.99.
We plot the t-Stochastic Neighbor Embedding representation (t-SNE) from
IV3 for the clean, noisy and adversarial examples (FGSM) in Fig. 3 for the
classification task to further illustrate this difference. Contrasting Fig. 3(L) with
Fig. 3(R), we clearly observe that images distorted with noise are embedded
close to the clean images, while adversarial examples are pushed further towards
other classes. The anomalous nature of the adversarial examples clearly supports
our hypothesis that their behavior is not akin to noise and can act as a harder
benchmark for evaluating a model’s robustness.
3 Experiments
To provide a proof-of-concept for the proposed robustness evaluation we chose
the challenging tasks of fine-grained skin lesion classification using dermatoscopic
images and segmentation of the whole brain in T1w-MRI scans. The task-specific
model learning is described as follows:
Classification: We fine-tune three state-of-the art deep learning architectures
namely, InceptionV3 (IV3) [2], InceptionV4 (IV4) [2] and MobileNet (MN) [9]
for this task. Both IV3 and IV4 are very-deep architectures (> 100 layers), while
MN is significantly compact. Comparing these architectures would help discover
if any innate relationships exist between model complexity (in terms of depth and
parameters) and their robustness. To keep the comparisons fair, all the models
were initialized with their respective ImageNet parameters and fine-tuned with
a weighted cross-entropy loss with affine data augmentation. Specifically, the
models were trained with stochastic gradient descent with a decaying learning
rate initialized at 0.01, momentum of 0.9 and dropout of 0.8 for regularization.
We use the publicly-available Dermofit [10] image library consisting of 1300 high-
quality dermatoscopic images, with histologically validated fine grained expert
annotations (10 classes) for this task. The dataset was split at patient-level with
non-overlapping folds (50% for training and rest for testing).
Segmentation: For this task we chose to evaluate three popular fully-convoluti-
onal deep architectures, namely SegNet (SN) [11], UNet (UN) [3] and DenseNet
(DN) [12]. Contrasting across these architectures, we evaluate the importance of
skip connections with respect to robustness varying from no skip connections in
SN to introducing long-range skips in UN and both long and short-range skip
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IV3 [2] 0.710 0.693 0.641 6.897
IV4 [2] 0.810 0.761 0.633 17.72
MN [9] 0.800 0.647 0.564 24.55
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SN [11] 0.842 0.595 0.470 37.17
UN [3] 0.862 0.759 0.453 40.92
DN [12] 0.861 0.848 0.667 19.53
Table 1: Comparative evaluation
of the classification and segmen-
tation models on clean, noisy and
adversarial examples. We report
the average accuracy and Dice
overlap score along with the %
drop in performance on adversar-
ial examples with respect to per-
formance on clean data.
connections in DN. The model parameters (depth and layers) were chosen to
maintain comparable model complexity, so as to exclusively factor out the impact
of skip connections to robustness. The aforementioned models were trained with
a composite loss of weighted-cross entropy and Dice loss as proposed in [13]
and model optimization was performed with ADAM optimizer with an initial
learning rate of 0.001. We use 27 volumes from the publicly-available whole-
brain segmentation benchmark (subset of Open Access Series of Imaging Studies
(OASIS) dataset [14]) that was released as a part of the Multi-Atlas Labeling
Challenge in MICCAI 2012 [15], with 80-20 patient-level splits for training and
testing. The models for both tasks were trained until convergence using the
TensorFlow [16] deep learning library and adversarial examples for DF and SMA
attacks described in Sec. 2.2 were crafted using the FoolBox [17] library.
Following the model evaluation strategy presented in Sec. 2.2, adversarial
examples were crafted for each of the trained models and their robustness is
evaluated in terms of average classification accuracy and average Dice score. We
report the overall performance of the models in Table 1, where we compare the
performance of each model on clean and noisy images with their average score
against all the attacks. Furthermore, in Table 2 we are reporting the performance
of each model against all the black-box attacks separately.
We also report the ROC curves for the class of malignant melanoma in Fig. 4
(Left) and the average and structure-wise Dice score for prominent structures in
Fig. 4 (Right).
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Robustness Evaluation for Classification
Visual Evaluation: Fig. 2 (Left) illustrates adversarial examples crafted for
an unseen test example (belonging to malignant melanoma class) for each of
the classification related attacks (FGSM, DF and SMA) alongside an image
perturbed with Gaussian noise for comparison. A scaled version of the differ-
ence image with respect to the original is also shown along with the posterior
probabilities estimated using IV3 network. We observe that all the adversarial
examples, regardless of the attack are consistently misclassified with very high
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IV3 IV4 MN IV3 IV4 MN IV3 V4 MN
IV3 [2] 0.449 0.548 0.567 0.729 0.707 0.664 0.738 0.701 0.669
IV4 [2] 0.429 0.411 0.451 0.743 0.768 0.697 0.735 0.778 0.683
MN [9] 0.335 0.275 0.213 0.726 0.731 0.672 0.732 0.735 0.661
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Type A Type B Type C
SN UN DN SN UN DN SN UN DN
SN [11] 0.277 0.272 0.309 0.397 0.473 0.428 0.669 0.702 0.705
UN [3] 0.248 0.434 0.258 0.364 0.434 0.368 0.636 0.653 0.677
DN [12] 0.600 0.528 0.415 0.749 0.721 0.563 0.819 0.791 0.814
Table 2: Comparative evaluation of model robustness using black-box attacks for
the tasks of classification and segmentation. We report the average accuracy for
classification and average Dice overlap score across structures for segmentation.
confidence, while the addition of Gaussian noise only results in confidence re-
duction. Furthermore, FGSM induces perturbations dispersed across the whole
image, while DF and SMA generate perturbations more localized to the lesion.
Attacks: From Table 1, we observe that IV4 and MN both achieve comparable
performance on clean data (80-81%) superior to the one of IV3 (71%). By lim-
iting model evaluation to generalizability (i.e. performance on clean data) one
may prematurely conclude that IV3 demonstrates the worst comparative perfor-
mance. However, upon comparing the robustness of these models with respect
to average performance under all the attacks (Table 2), we observe a contrary
trend. The performance drop for IV3 is significantly lower (7%) in comparison
to IV4 (17%) and MN (25%). IV4 achieves higher accuracy on DF and SMA
attacks, while IV3 is the most robust model against FGSM. Contrasting IV4
and MN, we observe that MN performs poorly not only on noisy samples but
also on all of the attacks, as shown in Table 2. These contrasting observations
clearly substantiate the core hypothesis within the paper that model evaluation
should not be limited to generalizability and that performing robustness evalua-
tion is equally important. Despite showing comparable performance in terms of
generalizability, we can clearly conclude that IV4 is strongly preferred over MN.
4.2 Robustness Evaluation for Segmentation
Visual Evaluation: Fig. 2 (Right) illustrates how the prediction maps of the
trained DN model transform when it is attacked by adversarial examples. All
the DAG attacks (Type A-C) successfully fool the model into producing an
incorrect prediction map. However, the prediction on the image distorted with
Rician noise is visually very similar to the one of the original image and the
ground truth. This clearly demonstrates that adding adversarial perturbation is
not akin to adding randomly generated noise. Thus, adversarial examples are
superior in pushing a network to its limits and evaluating its robustness.
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Fig. 4: (Left) ROC Curves for InceptionV3 on clean, noisy and adversarial im-
ages. Notice the varying drop in performance for the different types of attacks.
(Right) Bar Chart for DenseNet showing the Dice Score achieved for 3 structures
as well as the average across all structures against 3 types of attacks and images
distorted with Rician noise.
Attacks: From Table 1, we observe that DN (86.1%) and UN (86.2%) achieve
almost identical performance on clean unseen test examples and fare better than
SN (84.2%), highlighting the importance of skip connections. Furthermore, the
fact that the performance drop caused by the addition of Rician noise remains
low for UN and DN (10% and 1% respectively) reinforces the distinction between
noise and adversarial perturbations. Regarding model performance with respect
to adversarial attacks in Table 2, we observe that DN is not only resilient to
noise but also significantly more robust than SN (by 18%) and UN (by 21%)
to attacks crafted by any other model. Furthermore, SN and UN remain highly
vulnerable to all the attacks with a significant 37-40% drop in their average Dice
score. In consensus to the classification results discussed earlier, comparing the
three segmentation models only in terms of generalizability would not have been
sufficient to determine the best one. Both its resilience to samples distorted with
Rician noise and its consistent resistance to adversarial attacks make DN the
strongest model among its competitors for this task.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, for the first time, we explored adversarial examples in medical
imaging for the tasks of classification and segmentation. We propose a strategy
for model evaluation by leveraging task-specific adversarial attacks, that evaluate
not only a model’s generalizability, but also its robustness. We showed that
for two models with comparable performance, their relative exploration of the
underlying data manifold may have significant differences, hence resulting in
varying robustness and model sensitivities. Specifically, we demonstrate that for
segmentation tasks the use of dense blocks and skip connections contributes
to both improved generalizability and robustness, while model depth seems to
increase the resistance of classification models to adversarial examples.
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